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Ecfnjimc Conference UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK -----x 2 3 PATRICIO JIMENEZ, et al., 4 Plaintiffs, 5 14 Civ. 2994 (SAS) V. 6 THE CITY OF NEW YORK, et al.,, 7 Defendants. 8 9 New York, N.Y. December 15, 2014 10 3:05 p.m. Before: 11 12 HON. SHIRA A. SCHEINDLIN, 13 District Judge 14 APPEARANCES 15 GREGORY MOUTON Attorney for Plaintiffs 16 NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT 17 Attorneys for City Defendants BY: TOBIAS ZIMMERMAN 18 LESTER SCHWAB KATZ & DWYER 19 Attorneys for Mt. Sinai Defendants BY: THOMAS A. CATALANO 20 21 22 23 24 25

(In open court)

THE COURT: I have three letters, all dated December 3, and then one letter dated December 8. I have a letter from the city, Mr. Zimmerman.

I have a letter from Mount Sinai Hospital and Mount Sinai Hospital Group, from Mr. Catalano. They are both dated the 3rd.

And then there is a letter from Mr. Mouton. I think it's misdated. It's dated the 2nd, but I think it's meant to be dated the 3rd, because it responds to the other letters, and it's docketed on the 3rd. So I think it's meant to be dated the 3rd.

Then I have a letter dated December 8, from

Mr. Mouton -- actually, the second letter, of the 8th, responds
to the Mount Sinai's letter, and his letter of the 3rd responds
to the City's letter. That's why there's two letters from
plaintiffs' attorney, and one each from each of the defendant
groups.

The letter from the City and also from the Mount Sinai defendants asks for two forms of relief. It says that the third amended complaint essentially can't stand and shouldn't be permitted to stand and it was filed inappropriately without permission of the Court and beyond what the court had said it would allow.

Then it also asked for sanctions against the

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plaintiffs' attorney, Mr. Mouton, for going ahead with this Then the hospital's letter agrees and says the third filina. amended complaint can't stand against the hospital defendants, and they should be dismissed.

And then Mr. Mouton's reply disagrees obviously with both of the two letters and explains why he thinks it was proper to filed the third amended complaint, why the city is a proper defendant in this lawsuit, why Harlem Hospital Center is a proper party in this lawsuit, and then, finally, why the Mount Sinai defendants are proper defendants in this lawsuit.

That is, I think, a fair summary of the four letters. But there's some disconnect here, I have to say, because it does feel as if the Court's first opinion and order, which was a lot of work, essentially has been ignored, and so has the conference. It seems like plaintiffs' attorney is just determined to continue the lawsuit on behalf of Maribel Jimenez, even if there is really no legal ground to stand on and really no jurisdiction.

So, Mr. Mouton, I think the ball is in your court to explain to me why some of the arguments made in the defendants' letters aren't correct.

For example, in the letter from Mr. Catalano, he says, among other things, Title VI doesn't even have a private right of action based upon language discrimination, and there's no reason that the parallel section of the Affordable Care Act

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would permit a private right of action either.

Then he says that the Mount Sinai SAVI -- I don't know the acronym, but the Mt. Sinai SAVI program doesn't receive federal financial assistance anyway, which is required under the Title VI claim.

As you wrote in your letter, it says, Title VI, Section 601 says no person in the U.S. shall on the ground of race, color, or national origin be excluded from participation in or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.

Then Mr. Catalano says, well, this program is not receiving federal financial assistance. So that's one ground to say that the Mount Sinai defendants shouldn't be there.

But then he points out, and we went through all this on the motion, that in fact there was an interpreter, a volunteer interpreter present. I've already addressed that in the first motion.

If the person stayed two minutes or ten minutes, it is nothing to do with Mount Sinai. It's not their problem. don't see why the Mount Sinai defendants are being brought back, and I don't think that is what I allowed.

When I allowed leave to amend I was very specific as to the narrow permission there. It talked about the negligent supervision claim, the negligent hiring claim, and then at the last conference there was a question about federal jurisdiction

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anyway, and the city attorney pointed out that Maribel's claims were state claims only, and there wasn't a basis to bring her claims here. So you have invented this idea of the Title VI claim and the Affordable Care Act claim, which Mr. Catalano says has no private right of action.

I'm really confused and I am not anxious to go through another round of briefing again and another motion and decision, which will probably come out the same way. I don't think it's fair to any of us that is, you wasting your time, the defense counsel wasting their time, and, worst of all, you are going to waste the Court's time.

I don't think Ms. Jimenez has a case here. Why don't you just stick with your false arrest claim, if you have one, on Patricio's behalf. I don't know what your problem is with respect to Maribel. What is the big claim? That you don't think she was given an interpreter for long enough?

MR. MOUTON: Your Honor, I can tell you the Court has already addressed this issue in the matter of Loeffler, which is cited in my response to the Mount Sinai defendants' case.

THE COURT: I will go look at your letter for a Just don't say another word until I can look up what you just said. Meanwhile, in your December 8 letter, that's the one where you cited a whole lot of cases -- and now you are saying which one? Matter of what?

> MR. MOUTON: It is in Loeffler.

MR. MOUTON: L-o-e-f-f-l-e-r.

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THE COURT: I clearly can't hear you because I can't find that case. Could you spell the word you are saying?

> THE COURT: You are saying it is in this letter.

MR. MOUTON: It is. It is on page 2. There is a case which says that --

Surely. It should say Loeffler. THE COURT: what it should say. Does it?

MR. MOUTON: Yes.

THE COURT: I see it. Loeffler v. Staten Island, Second Circuit 2009. It says, according to your letter, deliberate indifference -- let's start earlier. "Intentional discrimination does not require personal animosity or ill will. Rather, intentional discrimination may be inferred when a policymaker acted with at least deliberate indifference to the strong likelihood that a violation of a federally protected right will result."

Here's the Loeffler case: "Deliberate indifference can be shown when an official who at minimum has authority to address the alleged discrimination and institute corrective measures on the recipient's behalf, has actual knowledge of discrimination in the recipient's programs and fails adequately to respond."

I see the quote, but I don't know what it has to OK. do with this case. What is the alleged knowledge of

discrimination in the recipient's programs that the hospital failed to respond? What are you talking about?

MR. MOUTON: Yes, your Honor.

So just a little background on the Loeffler case.

THE COURT: I think you need a little background on this case. I'm sorry. This case just doesn't sound like either a case or a federal case. You are tenaciously holding on to something that just is no harm, no foul. I just don't know what your problem is.

Why don't you start from the beginning. What happened to Ms. Jimenez that makes you think you should be in this federal court on this case? What happened to her?

MR. MOUTON: For approximately five hours while Ms. Jimenez was at the hospital, they refused to provide her with an interpreter.

THE COURT: Who refused?

MR. MOUTON: The employees at the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation, HHC, and the Mount Sinai Hospital Group as well.

Ms. Jimenez during that time was provided with an interpreter, but only for two minutes of time. That was via a phone, which goes against the Health and Hospitals rules and --

THE COURT: Who provided this interpreter?

MR. MOUTON: HHC did, New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation. They did that for two minutes when they

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should have provided her with a face-to-face interpreter.

Not only that, but going back to the Loeffler case, which had a similar situation, where for a period of time before an interpreter was provided, the Court said, look, you might have provided that person with an interpreter at some particular point, but before that you refused to provide them with an interpreter, and for those reasons there is a violation.

THE COURT: Violation of what?

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ MOUTON: A violation of their federally protected rights.

THE COURT: What kind of case? Is Loeffler a 1983 based on solely on the failure to provide an interpreter?

MR. MOUTON: A sign language interpreter was not provided to someone in that particular case until later on during his treatment.

THE COURT: I know. What is the cause of action? During his treatment? He is a patient at the hospital?

MR. MOUTON: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: What is the cause of action?

MR. MOUTON: I believe it was Title VII, if I am not mistaken.

THE COURT: Title VII isn't Title VI.

MR. MOUTON: Let me give my clerks the citation. It's 582 F.3d 268.

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If I may, your Honor, I cited Kumantaros v. City of New York, which is on page 1 at the bottom, which says that Title VI and Title VII are analyzed in the same manner.

THE COURT: I saw that.

MR. MOUTON: So any case law would correspond to this.

THE COURT: But that is not right, because Title VII has a private right of action. Title VI may not.

MR. MOUTON: Again, that's incorrect that that is there no private right of action. There absolutely is. There is no private right of action under Section 602, but under Section 601 of Title VII --

THE COURT: I thought were you proceeding under 602.

MR. MOUTON: No, your Honor. Under 602 --

THE COURT: I thought you were proceeding under 602.

MR. MOUTON: Under 602 it allows HHS to develop rules and mandates and policy that hospitals have to adhere to.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. MOUTON: Under those guidelines, they issued Federal Register Rule 65 247, 80875. Under that rule, or that mandate, the hospital as well as any other, in this case New York City HHC, and the Mount Sinai Group, they would have had to have provided face-to-face interpreters for my client unless there was an emergency situation, and in that case they could have provided a telephone.

We have cited disparate impact, which can be used to

show that there was an intentional violation in this particular case.

THE COURT: What are you talking about? What disparate impact?

MR. MOUTON: In this case, we have a situation where the hospital is located in a heavily populated area with Spanish-speaking persons.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. MOUTON: They knew that. Because of that they knew that they should have provided face-to-face interpreters at their hospital and they didn't. That impacts anyone who comes into that hospital who is not English proficient and speaks Spanish.

For those reasons it is our belief, and because they have a policy, and actually HHC has a policy that's posted on their website where they only provide Spanish interpreters during business hours, and they provide nothing outside of business hours. That goes directly against the rules that are provided by HHS.

So we have not only shown that there is an intentional violation, because they didn't provide an interpreter to her and let her participate in the services of the hospital, provided she wasn't able to participate in the SAVI program.

THE COURT: What is that acronym.

MR. MOUTON: Sexual assault and violence program, that

she was forced to participate in, that she was forced into contact with the criminal justice system. For all those reasons, that could be used to show that there was an intentional violation.

THE COURT: What was she doing at the hospital for five hours?

MR. MOUTON: She was at the hospital because she passed out in her bathroom and she believed that she was assaulted by her husband. They tested her. It was clear to them that she was suffering from diabetes, but they still referred her to the SAVI program. During the entire time, except for two minutes, she wasn't provided an interpreter. She doesn't speak any English. She wasn't able to participate at all.

THE COURT: In Loeffler there was an ADA claim,

Americans with Disabilities Act claim. That's it. ADA.

MR. MOUTON: I would point out, your Honor, also there is case law that says ADA claims and Title VI claims are decided in the same manner.

THE COURT: I know. But where is the case that says there is a private right of action under Title VI? Your adversary says there isn't.

MR. MOUTON: In my first page, the remedies available in a private right of action under Title VI are coextensive with those under Title I of ADA and Section 504 of the

Rehabilitation Act and that's Barnes v. Gorman.

THE COURT: Which is the Supreme Court case.

So, Mr. Catalano, this sentence says, citing a Supreme Court case, the remedies available in a private right of action under Title VI are coextensive with those under Title II of the ADA and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.

I can now ask my clerk to look that page up to see if it's true. How could you write me that there is not private right of action if the Supreme Court says so?

MR. CATALANO: I wrote there wasn't a private action under based upon the language discrimination. If there is intentional discrimination, there would be a private right of action.

The argument they are making is this hospital was located in Harlem. Harlem has a lot of Hispanic people.

That's discriminatory impact.

What the Supreme Court held in Alexander v. Sandoval was exactly that. In that case there was no driver's test in Spanish, and they brought an action based upon that. The Supreme Court said, no, that's disparate impact. There's no cause of action.

The regulation Mr. Mouton is citing was 2000. This is 2001. I also cited a case, the Perdide v. Page, which is a California case, but it is exactly the same situation, failure to provide an interpreter. In that case the disparate impact

is what's not cognizable according to the Supreme Court.

Of course, that's the more complicated argument. Our main argument really is there was no interpreter needed. In the City of New York, the city's required to have an interpreter in the emergency room. This thing happened Christmas night three o'clock in the morning. My volunteer was walking up at 2 o'clock in the morning, rushed to the hospital, got there at 3 o'clock in the morning. Was she supposed to bring an interpreter with her? The interpreter is always with the emergency room.

THE COURT: Now you lost me. You said there's always supposed to be an interpreter in the emergency room. Was there one?

MR. CATALANO: Yes.

THE COURT: You just said no. He said there was one on the phone for two minutes.

MR. CATALANO: That's what I mean. There was a phone there. That is not our job, your Honor. We are volunteer service.

THE COURT: I thought you just said the hospital was required to have one available in the emergency room at all times? Didn't you say that?

MR. CATALANO: I did, your Honor. But they did it by phone.

THE COURT: Which is it? Are they required to have

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1	one present in the emergency room at all times?
2	MR. CATALANO: In my own opinion, your Honor, it
3	doesn't matter. I am just reading from the statute.

THE COURT: What statute?

MR. CATALANO: It is in a footnote of my letter. Footnote 3.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. CATALANO: The immediate provision of interpretation services. What does that mean? Does that mean by phone or face to face? I don't know.

MR. MOUTON: Your Honor, if I may.

MR. CATALANO: My situation is we are a volunteer service. People are at home. My volunteers are at home sleeping until they get a phone call from the emergency room that someone has complained about being sexually abused. My client then goes down there by car service.

THE COURT: Who is your client?

MR. CATALANO: Mount Sinai operates the SAVI program, Sexual Assault Violence Intervention program. That is our program.

THE COURT: Who is your client?

MR. CATALANO: Mount Sinai.

THE COURT: Your client isn't a volunteer service.

MR. CATALANO: Yes, your Honor. SAVI is a

volunteer -- Mount Sinai is --

1 THE COURT: Mount Sinai is a big hospital. MR. CATALANO: 2 It is. 3 THE COURT: It is not a volunteer service. 4 MR. CATALANO: Ms. Cohen, the woman who went down 5 there, as you previously held in your decision, was a volunteer. She works as a volunteer. 6 7 THE COURT: She does, but you represent Mount Sinai. Mount Sinai has an obligation under this board of health rule 8 9 to immediately provide interpreting services for 10 non-English-speaking residents in all hospital emergency rooms. 11 They certainly didn't do it immediately. 12 MR. CATALANO: This is not a Mount Sinai emergency 13 This is a city hospital emergency room. room. 14 THE COURT: Oh. 15 MR. CATALANO: She goes to a city hospital. provided services to the city hospital. The only services we 16 17 provide are volunteer women. She gets a call 2 o'clock in the 18 morning. 19 THE COURT: So she's never at Mount Sinai? 20 MR. CATALANO: No one's at Mount Sinai. 21 THE COURT: Oh. 22 MR. CATALANO: She comes from her house at 2 o'clock 23 in the morning. She gets to the city hospital, Harlem 24 Hospital, at 3 o'clock in the morning. She didn't bring an

interpreter, because everyone knows that every emergency room

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	Conference
1	has an interpreter.
2	THE COURT: It didn't?
3	MR. CATALANO: It did have an interpreter. The city
4	had supplied an interpreter.
5	THE COURT: You mean the two minute thing?
6	MR. CATALANO: I don't know if it was two minutes or
7	not.
8	THE COURT: Let's assume it was, but it was hours
9	after she came there.
10	MR. CATALANO: Your Honor, I have an advocate report
11	form. My client sat down with this woman with an interpreter,
12	on the phone albeit, and I have a whole report about everything
13	she says.
14	THE COURT: Right. He says she was there for hours
15	before even the two minutes kicked in.
16	Didn't you say that, Mr. Mouton?
17	MR. MOUTON: Yes, your Honor. And after those two
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minutes --

THE COURT: What time did she arrive?

MR. MOUTON: She arrived early in the morning. I believe was 2 a.m.

THE COURT: When did she get the two minutes?

MR. MOUTON: She got the two minutes hours later.

THE COURT: Does the report say what time?

MR. CATALANO: 2:59. Well, the client's time of

arrival was 2:59 a.m., and I am not sure when my person got there.

THE COURT: He's saying it's hours.

MR. MOUTON: Your Honor, the issue here is that Mount Sinai has these satellite programs at various hospitals. I don't know if there is an agreement between Mount Sinai and New York City HHC to provide interpretation services, but if Mount Sinai has these satellite services and they are located in this Hispanic neighborhood, they should be providing interpretation services pursuant to the HHS regulations, unless there is some sort of on agreement where they are going to be indemnified by the city.

THE COURT: Is this an HHS regulation or a city regulation? It says, his letter, "The board of health shall require the immediate provision of interpretation services."

MR. MOUTON: No, your Honor. It is in the Federal Register --

THE COURT: This footnote is whose regulation, the quote. Sat.

MR. CATALANO: That is from the city charter, the administrative code.

MR. MOUTON: I'm citing a federal rule that is promulgated by HHS.

THE COURT: What does that one say. Is that in your letter?

MR. MOUTON: It says that health care organizations -- yes, your Honor, on page 2.

THE COURT: Which letter? You have two letters.

MR. MOUTON: I apologize. The December 8 letter, on page 2. It says, "Health care organizations must offer and provide language assistance services at no cost to each patient" --

THE COURT: Let me find it. Go ahead.

MR. MOUTON: -- "with limited English proficiency at all points of contact in a timely manner during all hours of operation."

It says that that this is mandated for all recipients of federal funds. It goes on to define what it believes that, how they should provide these interpretation services.

THE COURT: He's saying he is not a recipient of federal services.

MR. MOUTON: The SAVI program might not directly receive funds but Mount Sinai does, and Mount Sinai controls the SAVI program. It is not a separate division. The statute defines a program as a business that operates a health care organization. That's what it defines it as, not as some separate program that they offer or anything like that. It's whether or not the business that runs that program is a health care organization.

MR. CATALANO: Your Honor, we are not providing heath

care in this instance, as you previously held. We are providing a person, a woman, a volunteer who comes in, and she's there to hold a person's hand to give them advice as to what they need to do in terms of obtaining more services or counseling, that they have a right to bring charges, things like that. That program is mandated by the city. So we are not providing any medical care. It would be unrealistic —

THE COURT: Basically you are saying you are not a health care organization, but he's saying Mount Sinai is a health care organization.

MR. MOUTON: Your Honor, if I may, on page 1, I actually have the definition of it. It's in paragraph 2 of the December 8 letter. It says, "A program or activity is defined as an entire corporation, partnership, or other private organization or an entire sole proprietorship which is principally engaged in the business of providing health care." That's 42 U.S.C. 2000d-4A. That is exactly what Mount Sinai is.

THE COURT: Mount Sinai is, SAVI isn't. You are saying it doesn't matter. SAVI is just a program operated by Mount Sinai.

MR. MOUTON: Yes, your Honor.

MR. CATALANO: Is everyone supposed to bring an interpreter? Should doctors have their own interpreter or nurse?

THE COURT: No. As it relates to the emergency room, there should be somebody on duty all the time, just like there is a doctor on duty, a resident on duty, an intern on duty. I guess there has to be an interpreter on duty in every emergency room.

MR. CATALANO: Exactly, your Honor. But there was.

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THE COURT: No, there wasn't. I don't know what time this two minutes occurred. She got there at 2:59. I don't know. He says hours. Let's say that this interpreter kicked in at 5 a.m. She is in the hospital emergency room for two hours unable to communicate.

MR. CATALANO: That has nothing to do my client.

MR. ZIMMERMAN: If I may, your Honor.

THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Zimmerman.

MR. ZIMMERMAN: If I may, your Honor first of all, I would like to point out in the original complaint, part of the claim was that the interpretation services provided were inadequate. In fact, CyraCom, the company that provided those, was a party before your Honor and you dismissed it.

If I could take a step back, now very in the weeds on the facts of this case, which since we are at the pleading stage, we have only given the Court -- the first translator in this case was plaintiffs' own daughter who allegedly informed the EMTs that she had been assaulted by her husband when he came home drunk. The EMTs wrote that in their ambulance call

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report. That information was passed along the chain of command.

My specialty, as you know, is false arrest cases. I am not prepared to argue whether there is a private right of action for a violation of the New York Administrative Code, etc. If Mrs. Jimenez has a claim for the negligent provision or the failure to provide, the negligent disclosure, I think that claim should be in state court.

THE COURT: I know you do. But he thinks there is a federal claim under Title VI and under the Affordable Care Act, and he gives all these cases of why the Supreme Court and other courts have said so.

MR. ZIMMERMAN: I would suggest in response to his letter he suggests that it would be inefficient, because if he filed a separate federal action, it would simply be consolidated with this one.

I would disagree. There is really no commonality of the facts and circumstances. So, if he has a legitimate claim, I would urge him to file a complaint on behalf of Ms. Jimenez that makes those claims, and we can move ahead with the false arrest claim in this case that is really what we are all here for.

THE COURT: Let me understand. You are saying if he has a federal case for Mrs. Jimenez under these federal laws, Title VI or the Affordable Care Act, or both, you are saying

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that is really a separate lawsuit. That is her issue, that is not the false arrest case against Mr. Jimenez, and they are really not one case.

MR. ZIMMERMAN: Absolutely, your Honor.

THE COURT: She really has her own case, her own problem. It is either viable under the law or not viable. But it's really not related to the alleged false arrest for him.

MR. ZIMMERMAN: Absolutely, your Honor. In fact, the

THE COURT: I guess the only way it's related is if she could have told the hospital that he didn't do anything.

MR. ZIMMERMAN: But the police interviewed her.

THE COURT: What?

MR. ZIMMERMAN: The police interviewed her several weeks after the hospital. In fact, the detective that was just added was only present for that interview. He translated. And, again, allegedly she told them that she had been assaulted.

The false arrest, the allegedly false arrest was based on a chain of information that only partially included the hospital. The police didn't make the arrest until long after she had been released from the hospital. So there may be some overlap in the early part of the case, but the legal issues are completely different, divergent as we can —

THE COURT: They are. Your issue is going to be was

there probable cause for the arrest. If she said after being released from the hospital, "He assaulted me," then one would think there is probable cause, and that's it for the false arrest case and we move on to this other case.

MR. ZIMMERMAN: In fact, if plaintiffs' allegations are -- I think his case contradicts itself in a certain sense, because if the allegations about the hospital fabricating records is true, then the police again have probable cause because they are acting on information that they are entitled to accept as reliable.

So I don't think that it helps the plaintiffs very much to lump these two cases together. I certainly would rather proceed with the case I understand the law in and am able to argue to your Honor. We are ready to answer the complaint on those charges and proceed.

THE COURT: That is another good thought, Mr. Mouton. Why isn't her case -- her case, being deprived of language -- by the way, my clerk did look up the Barnes case, which is the Supreme Court case, Barnes v. Gorman, and it would be a private right of action, but only for intentional conduct.

MR. MOUTON: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: The question is, is this going to be provably intentional? Even so, this is a different case. This is a case about either they did or didn't fail to comply with the law of providing an interpreter in the emergency room.

Either it was or wasn't intentional. It really doesn't have anything to do with a false arrest case for Mr. Jimenez.

MR. ZIMMERMAN: If I make one other additional point, your Honor, the existence of 1988 and the attorney's fees under the 1983 action is another particular reason that this complicated issue should be separated. At the very least, if they are allowed to proceed together, I would ask that the Court order Mr. Mouton to bill separately for them.

THE COURT: I don't think they should proceed together. I also feel like I have two different cases. That's why my head was spinning a little bit. I was reading records looking at a false arrest case, and suddenly I am in the weeds of a case about whether you have to provide an interpreter or not and under what federal statute and whether it's intentional or can it be disparate impact. Apparently it can't be disparate impact. It has to be intentional discrimination.

I don't know why, if she was deprived of an interpreter for a couple of hours on Christmas Day or Christmas Eve, why you think that's because she was Hispanic. If they didn't have their interpreter there at all, that would apply to anybody who walked into the ER. I don't know why you think she was singled out. I guess you think it's because the area had a high Hispanic population, so everybody knew that people were going to walk who were going to speak Spanish, even though she comes in apparently with a daughter who acts as an interpreter.

I can't try the case now. I think that's what we are kind of doing. I think Mr. Zimmerman's last point is right. I am not going to allow this third amended complaint to be filed. It can't be filed as of right.

I did not issue an order permitting this third amended complaint. I am striking this third amended complaint. You can bring a lawsuit on her behalf. Buy a docket number, bring the lawsuit, do what you want with it. It is a different lawsuit than the false arrest claim. I give the limited right for leave to amend. You did something different. That is fine. It is a separate lawsuit.

MR. MOUTON: Your Honor --

THE COURT: That is my ruling today, Mr. Mouton. You are going to have to live with it. Bring a lawsuit for Mrs. Jimenez for the depravation of an interpreter, and we'll see how it plays out over the months and years ahead.

Let's move on with my very straightforward false arrest case.

MR. MOUTON: Certainly, your Honor.

THE COURT: I am not so sure you were right that you were right when you predicted, so I have to bring a separate case, it's only going to get consolidated it is all going to be one case, and we are going to be spinning our wheels. I am not sure that is right.

MR. MOUTON: Well, your Honor, I reviewed the

reasoning behind things being marked related. I will have to
plead almost exactly the same facts in that case, except for a
few paragraphs. I think I will to mark it as being related.

THE COURT: You will do what you have to do. But the
Court has its own rules.

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MR. MOUTON: Certainly, your Honor. The only thing I would ask, your Honor, is that I be able to transfer the state causes of action to that case because they are all part of the same facts.

THE COURT: Wait. What are you talking about? What state causes of action against whom on behalf of what plaintiff.

MR. MOUTON: Certainly, your Honor. In the complaint I have some state causes of action.

THE COURT: On behalf of Maribel?

MR. MOUTON: On behalf of Maribel, yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: The Maribel lawsuit is a lawsuit I haven't seen before. You will write your complaint in Maribel.

MR. MOUTON: I already thought in this particular case there was already --

THE COURT: The third amended complaint is completely stricken now.

MR. MOUTON: Yes. But before that, your Honor, I had a state law claim.

THE COURT: They were state law only. I had no

federal jurisdiction over those. Those are gone from my false arrest case. Whenever you bring the case on behalf of Maribel, this brand-new case you can plead federal and state claims, of course. Bring any claims you want.

MR. MOUTON: I guess the only issue is that the time to write that lawsuit has passed, so if I remove them from this case and then bring them in another case, it will be too late.

THE COURT: Not necessarily. You may have tolling from the time that you originally brought them. That is an argument that will have to be briefed before whatever judge has the Maribel case.

MR. MOUTON: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: That's what is going to happen. For the false arrest case that I have, do you need to file a second amended complaint, that's where I'm lost? On behalf of Patricio Jimenez, was there anything to change, or we're fine with the original complaint.

MR. ZIMMERMAN: I think we are talking about the second amended complaint now, which was superseded by the third. The second amended complaint -- my big request is that all these health care defendants, the New York HHC, all of those --

THE COURT: That's the other case.

MR. ZIMMERMAN: -- be taken out.

THE COURT: I agree.

MR. ZIMMERMAN: -- of Patricio's claims.

THE COURT: I agree. His case is a straightforward false arrest case.

MR. ZIMMERMAN: We should have a complaint that pleads --

THE COURT: That's what I think, too. That is what I am saying. We need an amended complain in the Patricio action, and we need a new complaint in the Maribel action. Where things fall out on the statute of limitations they do, but it is not a foregone conclusion that it is untimely, because it may relate back.

MR. MOUTON: The one thing.I wouldn't point out, your Honor, is that the city defendants have alleged that the city is no longer a proper defendant in this case, but there are respondent superior claims against the City of New York that are viable in this case, and they are, and the city is a proper defendant in this case.

THE COURT: In the state law claims for Patricio.

MR. MOUTON: Yes, your Honor.

 $\ensuremath{\mathsf{MR}}.$ ZIMMERMAN: I concede that, your Honor. That was an error on my part.

THE COURT: OK. He agrees with you. I need a new complaint on the false arrest case. I need a new complaint entirely on the Maribel case. If you want to mark it related, that is up to you. I am not saying whether I will take it.

There's lots of steps now.

MR. MOUTON: Yes, your Honor. I will review the rules again. If it is, I will mark it. If it's not, I won't mark it as well.

THE COURT: That's fine. I am not getting involved in the sanctions part of the case.

MR. CATALANO: Your Honor, can I assume that Mount Sinai will be out of this case?

THE COURT: I don't think they should be in the false arrest case. Do you?

MR. MOUTON: I don't think they will be. I will prepare another complaint tomorrow and obviously I will serve it.

THE COURT: That's right. They are not in the false arrest.

MR. CATALANO: There's this mediation coming up also. I want to make sure we get out of that.

THE COURT: I think we're set for today. You don't have to answer, the third amended complaint is stricken. I will issue a one-line order doing it.

MR. MOUTON: Do I file a fourth amended complaint.

THE COURT: No. The third amended complaint is stricken, the second amended complaint is stricken. It would be a new second amended complaint in the false arrest case. I will issue an order saying that so you know that. It will be

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on the docket.

MR. ZIMMERMAN: The mediation office asked us to bring to your Honor's attention the schedule because they felt compelled to schedule a mediation even though this dispute was going on. I guess we need to push the mediation date back since we have now pushed the whole case another month without an answer.

THE COURT: I don't know what the answer has to do with the mediation. You know the facts of this case. Go mediate.

MR. ZIMMERMAN: The question was because they were trying to bring Mount Sinai into the mediation.

THE COURT: The mediation is the false arrest case.

MR. ZIMMERMAN: All right.

THE COURT: I will issue a short order.

MR. ZIMMERMAN: I appreciate it. Thank you very much, your Honor.

> Thank you, your Honor. MR. CATALANO:

THE COURT: Do you have a scheduling order in place in the false arrest?

MR. MOUTON: We do.

MR. ZIMMERMAN: We do except that I will need a new date to answer based on when this.

THE COURT: You will work that out. But the rest of the schedule should be able to stand?

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Ecfnjimc Conference MR. ZIMMERMAN: I believe so, your Honor. MR. MOUTON: Yes, your Honor. THE COURT: All right. Good. Thank you. (Adjourned)